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Simone Ricca
Heritage, Nationalism and the Shifting Symbolism
of the Wailing Wall*
While before 1967 Israel opted to create alternative “holy” sites 1 to commem-
orate its establishment, the conquest of the West Bank and of the Old City of
Jerusalem gave Israel the possibility to relate directly to the hard core of Judaism
and its most celebrated symbols. A new interpretation of Jerusalem’s physical
townscape enabled the Israelis to turn a poor, run-down religious area in a
showcase of the State’s achievements, and into an Israeli stronghold shaped
according to the will of the secular Ashkenazi elite. The multifaceted bonds linking
heritage to nationalism, and ideology to the built environment, are embodied in
the reconstructed Jewish Quarter.
The study of symbols, the creation of historic narrative, “invented” tradi-
tions, and heritage symbolism, have become common fields of study among
Israeli researchers (Katriel, 1999; Zerubavel, 1995). Thus far, however, there
has been no attempt to apply this approach to the physical transformation of a
significant area of the Old City of Jerusalem. 2
Carried out by the Israeli authorities after the 1967 capture of East Jerusalem,
this transformation concerns in particular the “Wailing Wall”, that segment of
the outer compound of the Herodian Temple (and, by the same token, of the
Muslim Haram al-Sharif) which since early modern times has been a religious
focus for Jews. Yet these changes, which seek to erase a centuries-old Arab past
* A preliminary version of this article was reviewed by Ms. Linda Butler of the Institute
of Palestine Studies. The article was first published in Jerusalem Quarterly File, issue 24, Sum-
mer 2005 (abstract available on the online edition).
1. New secular symbols were created in the western part of Jerusalem where traditional
religious landmarks were not to be found: the zone of Givat Ram was selected as the site for
public administration and institutional buildings, while Mount Herzl became a national memo-
rial, a kind of alternative pilgrimage site, in the new Israeli city. The process of symbol creation
was completed when the Yad Vashem memorial, commemorating the shoah, was inaugurated
in 1959. With it, the State of Israel created for itself a “holy place” of its own in West Jerusalem,
a counterweight to the traditional sites that remained in the eastern, Jordanian-controlled part
of the city (Golani, 1999: 567-604).
2. With the notable exception of Nadia Abu El Haj’s work (Abu El Haj, 1995; 2001).
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and replace it with a new, exclusively Jewish space adapted to the symbolism
of a modern Jewish state, provide excellent grounds for such an approach. This
paper proposes to examine both alterations to this space’s meanings before 1967,
as well as physical changes to the Wall area since that time. It also proposes to
assess the extent to which recent efforts to make the Wall “the” Israeli national
symbol, celebrating both Zionist values and Jewish religious tradition, have
succeeded.
The Beginnings of Tradition
While the Wailing Wall today is universally acclaimed as Judaism’s most sacred
monument, its centrality to the religion is not as ancient as is commonly thought.
We know from pilgrims and travellers in the fifteenth century that it was not
the Wailing Wall, but the Mount of Olives outside the Old City that was dedi-
cated once a year to the commemoration of the destruction of the Temple. 3 The
Wailing Wall area, a narrow courtyard (120 square meters) in front of the Wall
enclaved within the fourteenth century Muslim Moroccan Quarter, was defined
and set apart only during the reign of Ottoman Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent
in the sixteenth century. F. E. Peters, in his comprehensive collection of travellers’
and pilgrims’ documents concerning Jerusalem, observes that only from the early
years of that century did Jewish visitors describe the Wailing Wall and connect
it with the earlier tradition of the “Presence of God.” (Peters, 1985: 528). Even
the “official” history of the Wall published by the Israeli defence ministry in
the early 1980s, while noting that “literary reports of travellers and pilgrims,
particularly in the last centuries, are full of descriptions of the Western Wall”
added that “... it should, however, be pointed out that for hundreds of years,
during nearly the whole of the Middle Ages, there is hardly any reference to the
Wall” (Ben Dov, Naor, Aner, 1983: 65).
There is no question, however, that by the nineteenth century the Wall had
become a central religious focus for Jews both locally and in the diaspora. Politi-
cization of the issue began in the twentieth century, especially following the
establishment of the British Mandate over Palestine at the end of World War I.
District Officer L. Cust observed in 1929 that “in certain Jewish circles the right
to pray has (...) become linked with the claim to actual ownership of the Wall”
(Cust, 1980: 45). By that time, the secular Zionist movement, cognizant of the
Wall’s importance as a symbol, had begun to cultivate it in the service of its cause.
As a result, it became the focus of growing tensions with the Muslim community.
3. Cf. the letter of the Italian Jewish pilgrim Rabbi Meshulam da Volterra who wrote in
1481: “And all the community of Jews, every year, goes up to Mount Zion on the day of Tisha
Be-’Av to fast and mourn, and from there they move down along Yoshafat Valley and up to
Mount of Olives. From there they see the whole Temple (the Temple Mount) and there they
weep and lament the destruction of this House” (Nom De Deu, 1987: 82 – my translation,
emphasis added).
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Tensions at the Wall are often marked as beginning in 1911, when the Otto-
man Administrative Council officially resolved to forbid Jews from bringing chairs
or screens for separating women and men into the narrow passageway in front
of the Wall (Cust, 1980: 46). In fact, tensions clearly existed far earlier, as evi-
denced by an 1840 decree by Ibrahim Pasha forbidding Jews to pave the passage
in front of the Wall (Löfgren, Barde, Van Kempen, 1930: Appendix VII). In
principle, the conduct of worship and the maintenance of the holy places in
Jerusalem were regulated by the Status Quo arrangements, established by the
Ottomans in the mid-eighteenth century and confirmed by the great powers in
the Treaty of Paris signed in 1855 (Berkovitz, 2001: 12), to reduce tensions and
mitigate rivalries over holy places among the religious communities. 4 Though
these particularly concerned the Christian holy places, traditionally they embraced
practices at Jewish holy sites as well, and were formally extended to the Wailing
Wall and to Rachel’s Tomb by the British during the Mandatory period. None-
theless, Jewish challenges to the Status Quo at the Wall continued and escalated
throughout the 1920s (Lundsten, 1978). The resulting tensions culminated in
the outbreak of violence known as “the Wailing Wall incident” in August 1929
(Dumper, 1997: 200), when a demonstration at the wall by militant Zionist
groups triggered rioting that resulted in the death of 133 Jews and 116 Arabs.
As a result of the Wailing Wall riots, in May 1930 Britain appointed, with
the approval of the League of Nations, an International Commission of Inquiry
for the Wailing Wall. The Commission’s report, presented in December 1930,
noted that while the “Jews do not claim any proprietorship to the Wall or to
the Pavement in front of it [emphasis added]”, the commission nonetheless
intended “to inquire into the question of legal ownership as a necessary basis
for determining the legal position in the matter”. In its final conclusions, the
Commission determined that the Jews would have free access to the Wall “for
the purpose of devotions at all times” (though subject to enumerated stipula-
tions) but that “to the Moslems belong the sole ownership of, and the sole proprie-
tary right to, the Western Wall” as well as to the pavement in front and the
adjacent Moroccan quarter (Löfgren, Barde, Van Kempen, 1930). The conclu-
sions of the Wall Commission were accorded the status of law—the King’s
Order-in-Council on Palestine (Western or Wailing Wall), 1931—and incorpo-
rated by the Mandatory Government as an integral part of the Status Quo of
the Holy Places (Berkovitz, 2001: 26).
Despite official prohibition by the Mandate authorities, Jewish national ral-
lies continued at the Wall throughout the 1930s and 1940s. The growing confi-
dence of the Zionist movement was apparent even at the time of the 1930 Wall
Commission, particularly evidenced by the suggestion of the Jewish committee
4. For a brief chronology relative to the “Status Quo” arrangements, see Survey of Palestine,
1991: 899-900.
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chosen to meet with the Commission 5 that the entire Moghrabi quarter, consti-
tuted entirely by waqf (religious endowment) properties, be vacated. In the eyes
of the Arab committee formed to meet with the Commission, this demand “shows
that the real intentions of the Jews are to lay hands by degrees on the Holy Places
of the Moslems and to become the masters of the country” (Löfgren, Barde, Van
Kempen, 1930: The Moslem Contentions -f-).
Competing Traditions
With the increased centrality of the Wall for Jews, new symbolic meanings
and traditions were attached to the site. Though its importance, as noted above,
had been growing during the second half of the nineteenth century, its signifi-
cance remained primarily “religious”, and some secular Zionists even found the
sight of Jews praying at the wall disturbing, redolent of backwardness. Ahad
Ha’am, one of the most prominent of the early Zionist pioneers, wrote in the
1880s: “as I stand and look at them, a single thought fills my mind. These stones
bear witness to the destruction of our land, and these men to the destruction of
our people. Which of the two catastrophes is the worse? Which gives greater
cause of mourning?” (Hertzberg, 1996: 157).
By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, what had once been a
purely “religious” site was being transformed into a nationalist issue, and the
Wall began to be celebrated by both orthodox and secular Zionists. It is true
that, as Akiva Orr has noted, the Wall was experienced very differently by the
two groups (Orr, 1983: 193), and their differing attitudes constituted a source
of conflict between them throughout the mandate period. Still, the Zionist move-
ment from the very outset realized the evocative power of the Wall and capital-
ized on it; the delegate cards for the early Zionist Congresses had the image of
Jews praying at the Wall on one side and the modern image of a pioneer working
the land on the other. 6 Moreover, the mingling of religious and national symbol-
isms increased. A 1935 Zionist tourist guidebook describes the commemoration
of Tisha B’Av, the date that traditionally commemorates the destruction of the
first and second Temples, as follows:
5. The committee included representatives of the Rabbinate of Palestine, the World Associ-
ation of Rabbis, the Jewish Agency, Vaad Leumi and Agudat Israel.
6. Rachel Arbel has observed how the seemingly antithetical symbols are in fact comple-
mentary: “The praying Jews represent the impotence of the Diaspora and a focus on the past.
Yet these opposites are complementary and interdependent: the pioneer relies on tradition, on
generations of Jews who yearned for Zion, and draws his strength from them, while the tradi-
tional Jew has no hope and future without the pioneer. (...) The use of emblematic images that
were both contradictory and complementary reflects the attempt of Zionist propaganda to
mitigate the revolutionary shock of national revival, to make room both for those eager to
change the face of Jewish culture and society and for those who wished to preserve the old
frameworks and traditions.” (Arbel, 1998: 22-23).
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“But the deepest impression is made by the Eve of Tisha be’Av (...). That evening a
veritable Jewish migration to the Wailing Wall sets in after dark. The thousands slowly
and silently pass before the everlasting stones far into the night; young and old,
believer and free-thinker, the Old Yishuv from the Street of the Jews and the Halutzim
from the colonies and Kvutzot. And if anywhere at all, here and at this hour you can
feel that am Israel khai, Israel is Alive.” (Kloetzel, 1935: 21).
Israeli sources emphasize the fact that in the same period, and as a reaction
to the growing Jewish interest in the Wall, a Muslim counter-narrative developed
celebrating the religious narrative of the sanctity of the tethering place of al-Buraq,
the Prophet’s magical steed. The Israeli Defence Ministry publication dates this
tradition to the mid-nineteenth century (Ben Dov, Naor, Aner, 1983: 62), while
alternative earlier locations for Buraq’s tethering place are listed in Elad’s Medie-
val Jerusalem and Islamic Worship (Elad, 1995: 99-104).
Though it appears evident that new attention was accorded to the al-Buraq
tradition in the early twentieth century, and a sort of planned development of
this “tradition” was staged by the Muslim religious authorities to counteract the
Jewish/Zionist claims, relatively ancient traces of the association of the site with
Muhammad’s magical steed do exist. A fourteenth century manuscript by Ibn
Furkah (d. 1328) states that al-Buraq was tethered outside Bab al-Nab, an old
name for a gate along the south-western wall of the Haram al-Sharif, located at
the very spot presently known as al-Buraq (Khalidi, 1997: 216, footnote 25).
Wilson’s map of Jerusalem of 1865 names the area around the Wailing Wall
“Hosh al-Buraq” (Wilson, 1876 and Tibawi, 1978: 46), and the 1840 Delibera-
tion refusing the Jews the right to pave the area in front of the Wall already
defines it as “the spot where al-Buraq was tethered” (Tibawi, 1978: 20).
Following the 1948 War and the expulsion of the Jews from the Old City,
the role of the Wall changed again: the Jordanian Authorities tried to minimize
the Jewish relevance of the site and stressed its uniquely “Arab” connotation.
This is visible, for example, in a Jordanian-period postcard 7 portraying a Pales-
tinian woman in “traditional” dress walking by the Wall. 8
June 1967: Erasing the Past
With Israel’s 1967 conquest of East Jerusalem, a dramatic transformation took
place. Immediately after the battle for the Old City ended, the entire Moroccan
Quarter was razed, and its 650 inhabitants were evicted with only three hours
to remove their belongings. 9 The section of the Wall dedicated to prayers was
7. The original colour postcard is reproduced in black and white in al-‘Alami (1981: 263).
8. The dress portrayed in the postcard seems typical of the north of the West Bank and
not of Jerusalem, but ethnographic accuracy was not necessary because foreign tourists were
the “target” of this highly symbolic image.
9. The destruction of the Moroccan Quarter has been detailed by the foreign press and by
foreign and Palestinian commentators (Dumper, 1997: 162).
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extended southwards to double its original length from 28 to 60 meters, while
the original facing open area of some four meters grew to 40 meters: the small
120 square meter area in front of the wall became the vast Western Wall Plaza,
covering 20,000 square meters over the ruins of the Moghrabi Quarter (Berkovitz,
2001: 27).
This radical transformation of the urban landscape, in clear violation of the
Geneva Convention 10 not to mention the Status Quo understandings, was decided
jointly by the military and civil authorities and later officially attributed to mayor
of Jerusalem Teddy Kollek. 11 The reasons for this move, which dramatically
marked the symbolic appropriation of the city by the Israelis, have been analyzed
by Meron Benvenisti 12 and by Uzi Benziman 13, but its long-term impact on the
city, its residents, and foreign visitors often goes unmentioned.
The millions of tourists who have visited Jerusalem since 1967 have no idea
of the site’s previous layout; Israeli tour-guides generally avoid any mention of
the Moroccan Quarter and its razing immediately after the June war. 14 Thus
this erasure was not only physical, but one of memory as well: the many publica-
tions about the Old City almost never include photographs of the site as it used
to be. Even the few available images of the Moroccan Quarter sold in the Old
City photography shops date from the beginning of the century, therefore pro-
moting a convenient confusion between the destruction caused by the 1948 fight-
ing and the deliberate erasure of the neighbourhood in 1967. This erasure, to
an extent, applies even to the younger generations of Palestinians who have
10. The Geneva Convention of 1949, signed and ratified by Israel on August 12th 1949,
art. 53, prohibits: “The destruction by an occupying power of moveable and immovable prop-
erty, except where such destruction is rendered necessary by military Operations”.
11. A recent unpublished report by Daniel Seidemann (2007: 4-5) details the demolition
of the Moroccan Quarter and presents a copy of the original hand-made sketch, drawn by an
Israeli architect, designing the area to be demolished.
12. “Despite the justified criticism, the act itself was seemingly inevitable. The Wall area
could not hold the hundreds of thousands who wished to come in 1967. Beyond the overwhelm-
ing practical considerations, however, an irrational impulse was at work. The move was the
settling of an historic account with those who had harassed the Jewish People over the centuries,
restricting and humiliating it at its holiest place, as well as with those who had prevented access
to the Wall for 19 years. The displaced inhabitants of the Moroccan Quarter were not personally
to blame, but it was their fate to be additional victims of the Arab-Israel conflict.” (Benvenisti,
1976: 307).
13. Haaretz journalist Uzi Benziman wrote that those in charge of bulldozing the Moghrabi
quarter, who speeded up the operation to avoid challenges: “... realized that their action was
motivated neither by security considerations nor by town planning. They were driven by some
mysterious feeling that they represented the Jewish people, that they were asserting Jewish
sovereignty over its most sacred place” (quoted in Tibawi, 1980: 184-85).
14. As an example of this attitude, on February 9, 2002, I was part of a guided tour (mainly
composed of members of the International Diplomatic Community) of the Jewish Quarter led
by the well-known author of an archaeological guide to the Holy Land. Not only did he not
mention the previous existence of the Moroccan Quarter in his description of the Wailing Wall
area, he even stated that the whole area up to the Wall has always belonged to the Jews.
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grown up knowing only the vast, empty Plaza—and this despite the fact that
many Palestinian families in the Old City have relatives who used to live in the
Moroccan Quarter 15 or in nearby buildings demolished to make way for the
greatly expanded Jewish Quarter. 16 Over the past 35 years, the new Plaza and
the totally revamped Jewish Quarter have become “traditional” features in a city
where Arabs and Jews speak different languages, live in separate worlds, and
do not intermingle. 17
The depiction of the Moroccan Quarter as a jumble of hovels (when it is
referred to at all) almost immediately became the official truth. 18 According to
a foreign resident of the Old City:
“The day the bulldozing began the quarter was described in The Jerusalem Post as a
slum. Two days later it was reported as having been by and large abandoned during
the siege. I expect in time that its existence will vanish altogether from the pages of
developing Zionist history.” (Schleifer, 1972).
These ideologically-motivated depictions are refuted by descriptions culled
from contemporary reports, interviews with former inhabitants (Abowd, 2001),
and old photographs of the quarter, all of which testify that the ancient medieval
quarter was a lively neighbourhood, its level of dilapidation mirroring that found
elsewhere in the Old City.
The following step in “clearing” the area, the demolition of the Abu Saud
complex 19 in front of Bab al-Magharibah, took place two years later in June
1969. An example of Mamluk architecture and a well-known element of the
15. One hundred and thirty five houses and two mosques were demolished.
16. The large-scale reconstruction project of the area that forms today’s Jewish Quarter is
not the subject of this article, but it might be useful to remember that in March 1968, 29 acres
(including the area of the demolished Moroccan Quarter) of the Old City were expropriated by
the Israeli authorities to create the new Jewish Quarter and that, according to Meron Benvenisti,
Jewish-owned property before 1948 comprised no more than 20% of the Quarter (Benvenisti,
1976: 239). The political implications of the reconstruction plan of the new extended Jewish
Quarter are discussed in Re-inventing Jerusalem, The Reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter
after 1967 (Ricca, 2007).
17. Edward Said has noted that the now-dominant Israeli narrative on Jerusalem has been
able: “... to project an idea of Jerusalem that contradicted not only its history, but its very lived
actuality, turning it from a multicultural and multireligious city into an ‘eternally’ unified,
principally Jewish city under exclusive Israeli sovereignty.” (1995: 7). For the religious syncre-
tism in Ottoman Jerusalem, see also Tamari, 1999.
18. See, for instance, Teddy Kollek’s and Ben Dov’s books (Kollek, 1978: 197; Ben Dov,
1983: 36).
19. That included the Fakhriyyah zawiya and the Abu Saud living quarters. It might note-
worthy to remember that the mother of the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, Zahwa Abu Saud,
was a member of the Abu Saud family. The Israeli journalist Danny Rubinstein writes in his
biography of Arafat: “It is doubtful that Yasser Arafat witnessed the demolition of the house,
but, on the few occasions he has spoken of his childhood, he mentioned the destruction of the
Abu Saud house along with vague hints and fragmentary remarks on childhood memories from
Jerusalem. As far as we can ascertain, Arafat did live in this house from 1933 to 1936, from
the age of four to seven. Perhaps he visited it on a few occasions afterwards.” (1995: 21-22).
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city landscape and history was removed to enlarge the excavation area and to
“free” access to the Haram al-Sharif for the Israeli army in case of troubles. In
this case too, the tendency to downgrade the architectural and historic value of
“inconvenient” buildings is evident in the above-mentioned Defence Ministry
publication’s description of the buildings:
“Even the remaining houses on the outcropping are unimportant. Although some date
from the Middle Ages, extensive reconstruction has been done in them in the 20th
century. One of them has a concrete roof supported by iron railways tracks! The
balconies of the buildings are also constructed of railways tracks which proves conclu-
sively that they do not predate our century. The presence of these buildings in the
area is purely accidental; a decision to remove them would be just as legitimate as
one to leave them there.” (Ben Dov, Naor, Aner, 1983: 167) 20.
This strategy of purposeful depreciation of the non-Jewish heritage of the
city can be seen in several developments involving the Wall. After the 1967
capture of the Old City, Jewish religious personalities pushed for “freeing” the
entire length of the 465-meter wall, proposing the demolition of all the Islamic
theological colleges (the Mamluk madrasas built along the outer wall of the
Haram al-Sharif constitute one of the pre-eminent architectural features of the
old city of Jerusalem 21) and Arab-inhabited buildings that had grown along it
during the centuries.
The case that caused the greatest controversy involved the “Little Wall”, the
only segment of the Western Wall (aside from the extended Wailing Wall) unob-
structed by later construction. Located in the courtyard of the thirteenth century
Ribat al-Kurd, a Mamluk period hospice near Bab al-Hadid, the wall was “dis-
covered” by Jewish religious groups during 1971/2. Though no previous Jewish
worship was attested there (Rabinovich, 1972: 9), they began to pray at the site
and tried to take over the property. Referring to an “ancient tradition”—for
which no evidence was produced—the site was quickly baptized the “Little
Kotel” to emphasize its connection with the Wailing Wall. 22 In this context, it
is important to note the distinction between the Wailing Wall and the Western
Wall. The International Commission established in 1930 to investigate the
“Wailing Wall”, for instance, specified that the “part of the wall about which
dispute has arisen between the Jews and the Moslems” (i.e., the “Wailing Wall”)
is about 30 meters long (Löfgren, Barde, Van Kempen, 1930); the tendency to
equate the two since the 1967 War appears to coincide with expanding claims
(these terms will be discussed in more detail below).
20. Though the book was published in 1983, it is evident that this chapter pre-dates the
demolition of June 1969.
21. For a complete historic and architectural record of these monuments, see Burgoyne,
1987.
22. In his analysis of Ribat al-Kurd, Michael Burgoyne suggests that the lower part of the
outer face of the Haram in the building’s courtyard belongs in fact to the Umayyad rebuilding
of the wall and not to the Herodian period (Burgoyne, 1987: 150).
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Meanwhile, excavations along the Wall to open an underground “tunnel”
and uncover the underlying Herodian stones, initiated in 1967 with the approval
of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, had caused serious damage to the same
Ribat al-Kurd and to some of the finest examples of Mamluk architecture in the
Old City. Digging was ordered halted. In the 16 February 1972 Knesset debate
concerning the damage, most speakers—using language and rhetorical technique
reminiscent of those used for the Moroccan Quarter—demanded that the entire
length of the Western Wall be cleared. The Ribat al-Kurd was presented as a
“slum” with no “historical significance”. 23 Rabbi Meir Kahane, leader of the
extremist Kach party, questioned the authority of the archaeologists that the
municipality had hired to assess the “historicity” of the Arab structures in rela-
tion to the Jewish “historicity” of the Wall. What was at stake was in fact the
role of heritage in shaping the city’s future.
Heritage and History
The symbolic significance of these changes and attempted changes might be
better understood with reference to the concept of “heritage” as defined by
David Lowenthal in The Heritage Crusade. Lowenthal distinguishes between
“History”, the past that actually happened, and “Heritage”, the past manipu-
lated for some present aim 24:
“Heritage links us with ancestors, certifies identities, builds collective pride and pur-
pose, but in so doing stresses distinctions between good guys (us) and bad guys (them).
Heritage faith and heritage rhetoric inflame enmity” (1998: 248).
The very definition of Israel as a “Jewish State” implies that its national
heritage must be a “Jewish Heritage”. It can easily follow, then, that all that is
not specifically “Jewish” might (or should) be removed. New “facts” can be
created that compete with those sought to be minimized—or the urban landscape
can simply be demolished and replaced with a more suitable one, as in this case.
Other questions to be pondered are those raised by Turndridge and Ashworth
in the preface of their 1996 Dissonant Heritage, where they say: “we will never
again look at a monument or exhibit without posing not only the ‘Whose herit-
age is this?’ question, but also the insistent Who is disinherited here and what
are the consequences of such dispossession?” (Tunbridge, Ashworth, 1996: xi).
23. Dr Zerah Warhaftig, then Minister for Religious Affairs, said that “... the Arab families
were suffering in their homes along the Wall ... (and) children could not grow properly under
such conditions”. Menachem Begin spoke of “ramshackle houses to be cleared”, while Dr Yitzhak
Raphael declared that the buildings “had no historical significance” (Jerusalem Post, 14 February,
1972, 7).
24. Other authors push further the debate and question the very nature of “history” by
inserting a three-level system separating the “past” (what has happened) from both “history”
(selective attempts to describe this) and “heritage” (a contemporary product shaped from his-
tory) (Tunbridge and Ashworth, 1996: 21).
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The answers, in the case of the Wall, are obvious: Palestinian heritage has
been erased, both from the physical map and from the map of memory, and the
consequences of this dispossession have buttressed Israeli claims to the city. Plans
for the Wall area have managed to erase from centre stage the complexity of
history and the embarrassing presence of other people’s heritage.
Israel’s efforts after 1967 to present an image of Jerusalem in keeping with
its political aspirations and vision of history (and thereby bolster principles like
“the unity of the Jewish people” and its “necessary realization in the Jewish State”)
entailed a large propaganda effort to celebrate the Wall and highlight its impor-
tance for Judaism. Pseudo-scientific books on the Jewish Quarter and the Wall
were published, 25 while new “traditions” centred on the Wall were developed.
In a Jerusalem Post article of 1971, for instance, we read:
[...] Tisha B’Av at the Western Wall is becoming ever more an international Jewish
Holiday [emphasis added] and ever less a day of mourning. To the tens of thousands
of Israelis and tourists who swarmed to the Old City last night when the fast com-
menced, The Wall was obviously more of a reminder of the Israeli victory four years
ago, than of the Jewish defeat and destruction of the Temple 1901 years ago (Landau,
1971: 13).
But in order to become the “universal” and “eternal” symbol of Judaism—
and in so doing strengthen the link with the Jewish Diaspora and forge a unity
between the diverse components of Israeli society (secular and religious, Ashkenazi
and Sephardi, Ultra Orthodox and Reform)—it was necessary to mute alternative
Jewish traditions as well as critical voices objecting to the “worship of stone”
or the partition between men and women at the Wall. 26 In other words, the
symbolism of the Wall had to be “adapted”. Linguistically, this change is repre-
sented by the rejection of the traditional term “Wailing Wall”, with its emphasis
on what has been lost, and its substitution with the more neutral “Western Wall”
(which is also conveniently ambiguous, designating, as it does, both the entire
western wall of the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif compound and the area
traditionally set apart for prayers). At the rhetorical level, the locus shifted from
the destruction of the temple to the themes of national renaissance.
This strategy, commenced in the 1920s, has been highly successful, and since
the June 1967 victory, the Wall has undoubtedly become the central altar of
25. See, for instance, the review by L. Abramovich of a book by A. Rivin where we read:
“With the renovation, reconstruction and repopulation of the Jerusalem Old City’s Jewish
Quarter in the last five years, there has been a revived interest in the history of Jerusalem. (...)
Many books have appeared describing people and periods of Jerusalem history. (...) Perhaps
the greatest contribution of such works, as the late Ben Gurion wrote in an introduction to the
book is that they make it possible for our youth to ‘know that Israel’s establishment did not
begin with the declaration of the State’. This book, and all the others of this genre, is a good
reminder that there were always Jews living here.” (Abramovich, 1974: 13).
26. This was, for instance, the approach of the Judaism Reform Movement. A gender-
centred analysis of the Wall, discussing the evolution of Jewish rituals, has been recently pub-
lished by Stuart Charmé (2005).
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the Israeli state. This success has not been welcomed by all. Israeli philosopher
Yeshayahu Leibowitz, for example, noted in an interview: “Twenty years ago,
neither those who practised the mizvot nor, obviously, those who did not, paid
attention to or even thought about the Western Wall. Why, after 2000 years of
Jewish life, should a new Judaism suddenly appear, seven days after the Six-Day
War, with the Western Wall?” (Storper-Perez, 1989: 98 [my translation]).
For the most part, however, religious and secular Israelis accord extraordi-
nary importance to the Wall as both a sanctuary and a monument. 27 This care-
fully planned double dimension is physically represented in the plaza. The space
in front of the Wall is composed of two distinct zones: the area closest to the
wall, for prayer, is the focus of traditional religious devotion and falls under the
aegis of the rabbinate. The more distant expanse of the plaza, controlled by
the government, became the representation of Israeli “civic religion”: military
parades, swearing-in ceremonies, commemoration of the soldiers fallen in war,
Jerusalem Day, and so on.
Further, emphasizing the “sanctity” of the Wall area allowed the Israeli gov-
ernment to divert attention from the (in its eyes) highly problematic site of the
Haram al-Sharif, which remained in Muslim hands. The Wall was officially
transformed into an open-air synagogue and the minister of religious affairs
explicitly declared it a holy place. Not only the Wall was declared “holy” under
the new regulations, but also the prayer square in front of it “including any
structure or passage above or below ground whose entrance is through the prayer
square” (Berkovitz, 2001: 20-21).
One of the tools used in establishing this consensus and underscoring the new
“secular” value of this site has been—as so often in Israel—archaeology. It was
hoped that through archaeology the Jewish right to the land could be affirmed
and traces of the Arab past erased (as in June 1969 when the Abu Saud complex
in front of Bab al-Magharibah was demolished in order to uncover a Herodian
road). In fact, however, the archaeological excavations at this extremely sensitive
site aggravated tensions between secular and religious Israelis, demonstrating the
delicate balance needed between the diverse elements with which the state was
playing and the fragile nature of their consensus over the celebration of the Wall.
The extensive excavations directed by Prof. Mazar of Hebrew University
between 1968 and 1977 near the southwest corner of the Haram, which uncov-
ered the remains of previously unknown Umayyad palaces, became the focus
of a long-lasting “battle” between the archaeologists and the rabbinate. These
hostilities were exposed when a decision was made to set aside a section of
the Western Wall for archaeological excavation, and intensified as soon as the
excavations extended northward along the wall towards the Wailing Wall and
the prayer area controlled by the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Rabinowitz, 1969).
27. According to a survey (Katz, Levy, Segal, 1997) 97% of Israeli Jews consider Jerusalem,
with the Wall at its centre, important as the “symbol of Israel”.
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The tension between archaeologists and the religious establishment reached
its peak in 1972, when the archaeologists demolished the building housing the
Supreme Rabbinical Court (originally a Girls’ School built by the Jordanians in
the early 1960s) in order to enlarge the dig. 28 Other simultaneous occurrences
showed the incompatibility of the two groups: the ongoing “unofficial” excava-
tions at the “tunnel” carried out by the Ministry of Religious Affairs without
archaeological supervision, and the polemics surrounding the excavation of Jewish
graves by archaeologists, considered unacceptable by the religious authorities
and by part of the religious public. The un-aesthetic “outcropping” leading to
Bab al-Magharibah, resulting from the June 1969 demolitions described above,
also should be viewed in this context. This area plays the role of frontier between
two parts of the very same wall: one set apart for secular needs, and one for
religious worship. The state, a third oversight body, acts as an arbitrator and
maintains control of the gate for “security” needs. 29
New Trends and the Shifting Symbolism of the Wall
Efforts to shape the link between ancient past and present rebirth through
architecture and planning have met with obstacles. Though the large esplanade
and the rebuilt Jewish Quarter conveyed to hundreds of thousands of citizens
and tourists the clear message of Israel’s control over the city, fear of disrupting a
precarious equilibrium has prevented the implementation of any comprehensive
architectural plan for the plaza. No design for the area, in fact, has ever received
the approval of both the secular and the religious establishments, and after more
than 30 years the large esplanade remains an open, shapeless and empty scar in
the heart of the dense urban fabric of the city.
The two best known design proposals for the Wailing Wall Plaza were prepared
by the internationally renowned architects Moshe Safdie and Isamu Noguchi
28. On the polemics surrounding this decision, see the articles on The Jerusalem Post by
David Landau (1972a, 1972b and 1972c).
29. Bab al-Magharibah is the only access to the Haram al-Sharif under full Israeli control.
It is considered essential by the Israelis to secure the control of the Haram as it facilitates access
for police and army intervention. The precarious status quo that developed at the site has been
altered by the sudden collapse, on February 2004, of the Moghrabi Gate ramp. While a tempo-
rary wooden ramp has rapidly been built over it, pressure has mounted from various Israeli
political groups for the construction of a new permanent access ramp larger and longer than
the original one. The actual plan for such a structure was approved by the Israeli authorities in
2006, but has not (yet?) been implemented following strong national and international criticisms.
The main actors of the debate that developed on June 28, 2006 in the Prime Minister’s office
concerning this project were: the Police, the Rabbinical Authority, the General Security Services,
the Israel Antiquities Authority and the Western Wall Heritage Foundation (Seidemann, 2001: 12).
The presence of the Western Wall Heritage Foundation, an association closely linked to the
Old City settler groups, in the debate shows that the State does not play anymore the role of
an external arbiter, but has instead partially integrated the agenda of these groups for the
Wailing Wall area.
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in the 1970s. Safdie’s plan—supported by the Israeli Jerusalem municipality
and heavily influenced by economic considerations and archaeological finds—
proposed a complex system of multi-level terraces and stairs leading down to
the original basis of the Wall, some ten meters below the present level. Isamu
Noguchi’s proposal, on the other hand, stressed further the symbolic relevance
of the site for all Jews by proposing the creation, in front of the Wall, of a
monument to the Holocaust—a large irregular block of black basalt. Though
extremely different in scope and sensitivity, both designs are based on the ideo-
logical assumption that the site has an exclusively Jewish significance.
But among Israeli Jewry, the goal of transforming the Wall into a unifying
symbol has substantially failed. In the last 30 years Israeli society has grown
more and more differentiated and internally divided; symbolism around the Wall
has evolved along with these changes and the blossoming of religious/messianic
movements.
A fracture between the planned “national” symbolism attributed to the Wall
and its actual use was already apparent in 1974, when, after a few years of
growing secularization in the commemoration of Tisha B’Av, the traditional
character of the celebration re-emerged, as indicated in press accounts. 30 With
the fading of “civil religion” and of the Zionist narrative, the Wall has been re-
appropriated by new religious communities 31 and other trends have developed
in connection with this religious re-appropriation. By this, I refer to the shifting
of attention from the Wall itself to the Haram al-Sharif and to the proposed
reconstruction of the Temple on the site of the Muslim mosques.
The “master commemorative narrative” 32 that created the Wall plaza and
the new Jewish Quarter as the symbol of continuity between the ancient past
and the modern Jewish state persists, but is now shared by a different constitu-
ency. This new “Jewish” community (including a large group of foreign born-
again Jews) that has developed within the quarter itself no longer pays much
attention to archaeology or to celebrating the heroism of the quarters’ defenders
in the 1948 battle. Rather, it longs for the “dream” of a new temple.
The physical environment of the Jewish Quarter has therefore changed to adapt
to new needs and values. This is particularly evident in the restored Byzantine
Cardo. What was planned as the main tourist-commercial axis of the rebuilt
quarter, with a didactic reconstruction of the original wooden roofing of the
shops of the ancient street, has been transformed into an exhibition hall for the
reconstructed vessel of the Third Temple.
30. The Jerusalem Post detailed this evolution in a series of articles: “It seemed that, as
daylight broke through, the traditional pattern of mourning that has marked Tisha B’Av through
the ages had resurfaced again.” (Siegel, 1974: 2).
31. Already in 1974, Geula Cohen said that the Wall was “a symbol of spiritual power
which could cure the ills of the sick nation.” (Anonymous, 1974: 3).
32. According to the definition of Yael Zerubavel (1995).
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In 1983, when discussing the issue of the planning of the Wailing Wall Plaza,
Meir Ben Dov underlined the Wall’s function as “surrogate” temple:
“Prayer at the Wall became important as a result of a compromise—because the
Temple is not rebuilt—but cannot, in any way, serve to transfer the spotlight form
the centre to the periphery. No matter how holy its tradition has become for many
but such a status is not within Jewish tradition. Any design for the Wall area must,
therefore, realize that the Wall does not represent the achievement of Judaism’s ulti-
mate hopes; that will be in the rebuilding of the Temple however theoretical that may
be and however delayed it may be till the arrival of the Messiah.” (Ben Dov, Naor,
Aner, 1983: 16).
With the growing political influence of extremist religious groups and
Israel’s ability to maintain its hold on the entire city, more and more individuals
have begun to reconsider the role of the Wall and turn their gaze towards the
Haram al-Sharif, site of the planned third temple, as they await its miraculous
transformation.
To underline the differences between mainstream Judaism and contemporary
ultra-orthodox groups in their perspective of the temple, we might compare the
late nineteenth century mizrah 33 which shows the Dome of the Rock with its
Muslim crescent under which is written in Hebrew “The site of the Temple”
(Ben Dov, Naor, Aner, 1983: 198), with the oft-reproduced poster depicting a
rebuilt Third Temple replacing the Muslim holy shrines, which is sold in many
Jewish Quarter bookshops.
Evolution: Towards a New Synthesis of Zionism and Tradition?
Since the end of the 1990s, a new evolution is taking place in the Jewish
Quarter: the revitalization of some out-moded Zionist symbols by the successive
rightist Israeli governments. Possibly worried by the excessive focus on the
Temple and its reconstruction, Israel’s rightwing governments are attempting to
establish fresh bonds between Zionist and religious values. The new public rela-
tions offensive is evident in a number of plans, presently at various stages of
implementation, whose goal is the revitalization of the reputation and of the
cityscape of the Jewish Quarter and the Wall plaza.
The most important among them, for its symbolic role, is the project for the
reconstruction à l’identique of the nineteenth century Hurva Synagogue, the
“heart” of the Ashkenazi community in the pre-1948 Quarter. While a similar
plan—favoured by Menahem Begin when he was Prime Minister—was refused
in the late 1970s by the architects and planners designing the new quarter (who
33. Mizrah means “East” in Hebrew, but the word is used also for the traditional Jewish
engraves (mostly featuring the word mizrah in Hebrew in the center) that were hung on the
eastern wall of a home to indicate the direction in which to pray.
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preferred, instead, to consolidate the ruins of the synagogue as a memorial to
the quarter’s 1948 destruction), in the new political framework:
“A public committee formed in 2002 by the Minister of Housing, Rabbi Yitzhak Levi
and headed by Rabbi Simha Kook, decided to restore the Hurva to its previous glory.
Mr Dov Kalmanovitch, chairman of JQDC’s board and Mr Yinon Ahiman, the
company’s CEO, the Minister of Housing Mr Nathan Sheransky and his successors
Ministers Effy Etham, Tzipi Livni, Ze’ev Boim, Yitzhak Herzog and Meir Shitrith all
harnessed themselves to the successful completion of the project. Past and present
mayors of Jerusalem, Mr Ehud Olmert and Mr Uri Lopliansky and substitute mayor
Rabbi Jehoshua Pollack are all enthusiastic supporters of the project.” (CDRJQ, http://
www.jewish-quarter.org.il/churva-malacha.asp).
The reconstruction of the 24-meter high dome of the Hurva is certainly going
to transform the image of the neighbourhood and the rebuilt synagogue might
become a new focal point for the religious community of the Jewish Quarter.
Nahum Miltzer, an Israeli architect, has prepared the plans for the reconstruction
in cooperation with the Israeli Antiquity Authorities. The project implementa-
tion started in 2006 and is scheduled to end by 2011. 34 In the official presenta-
tion of the project, architect Metzer affirms that the actual raison d’être of the
reconstruction is that the Hurva Synagogue “beyond all considerations of the
quality of the building (...) is connected to the historic memory of the Jewish
People.” 35
To this same new trend we might ascribe also the recently completed refur-
bishment of the Wall plaza (with the construction of stone-faced arcades along
its northern side), the planned enhancement of the archaeological exhibitions of
the Jewish Quarter and the creation of a new archaeological/religious attraction,
the Davidson Virtual Centre. This new “museum”, 36 whose design skilfully makes
use of some of the ruins of the archaeological garden near Dung Gate, is dedi-
cated to Jerusalem and pilgrimage to the Jerusalem Temple in Herod’s time. With
the support of high-tech computer graphics and virtual models, the visitor is intro-
duced to a virtual reality where everything is Jewish, where no “foreign” elements
perturb the scene. This extremely selective representation of a single moment in
the long and complex history of the city, though based on archaeological data
and probably scientifically correct, conveys an obvious political message. It
presents a mythical ancient city whose virtual houses bear an unexpected resem-
blance to the reconstructed Jewish Quarter buildings.
34. In 2002, the Israeli government allocated six million dollars for the reconstruction. On
February 2004, the Israeli Antiquities Authority had almost completed the salvage excavations
on the site and the plan had received most of the official approvals (Green, 2004).
35. Cf. the official website of the Company for the Reconstruction and Development of
the Jewish Quarter.
36. More than a museum, in fact, it is a “heritage centre”, a museum without original
artefacts, exhibiting only models and complex 3D computer simulations of the city before the
destruction of the Temple by the Romans.
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The main difference between these newly planned transformations and the
1970s project for the Jewish Quarter seems to lie in their openly-stated connec-
tion with Jewish religious symbols. What proved an impossible task for Israeli
governments in the seventies (i.e. the contemporary celebration of secular Zionist
and traditional religious values) seems nowadays possible through an insistence
on religious heritage and the partial playing down of nationalist-historic ele-
ments. Whether this new campaign will be able to divert the attention from the
possibilities of a Third Temple, recreating a larger national consensus and inter-
est in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem is still too early to say,
but it is obvious that these apparently minor transformations have in fact deep
political meaning, and represent new symbolic steps in the continued Israeli take-
over of the Old City of Jerusalem.
Conclusion
The city of Jerusalem developed for centuries within its city walls, keeping
almost immutable characteristics while continuously renewing its physical struc-
ture. Due to the continuity in building techniques and materials, the Old City
has been able to conserve its traditional image until the present day, the only
notable exception being the new Jewish Quarter. The alien features introduced
to this neighbourhood constitute an evident fracture amid the traditional Old
City urban fabric altered previously only by the nineteenth-century Christian
buildings constructed in “European” styles.
The military conquest of Jerusalem necessitated the city’s physical transfor-
mation, in order to adapt a typical Middle Eastern, medieval and mainly Arab
city to the symbolism and requirements of a modern Jewish state. The contrast
between the mythical image of the city in Jewish prayers and in Zionist political
expectations on the one side, and reality on the other, was too strong to sustain
the claims of Israeli ownership: hence, the transformation of both the human
and physical landscape of the Old City. The post-1967 Wailing Wall Plaza did
not come about as the result of destruction wrought by war; rather, it is the
embodiment of a national/religious programme aimed at underlining the eternal
link of the Jewish people with the Holy City. The goal of the urban plans carried
out by the Israelis in the Old City and in the area of the Wailing Wall, in fact,
has been to erase the living memory of a non-recognized Arab/Muslim past (and
present) and to replace it with a new space. The efforts to rebuild this environ-
ment as effective scenery for representing a new ruling power were carefully
planned and embody the symbolic role the Israeli government attributed to the
city. The Jewish Quarter plan, and the Wailing Wall Plaza, promote the claim
to the land at the international level by conveying the message of Israel’s right
of possession to and its “enlightened” rule over Jerusalem. The area known
today as the Jewish Quarter was designed to serve as a manifesto of the State
of Israel and of its approach to history and heritage: not only a modern quarter
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or just another Jewish settlement in the city, but the actual incarnation of the
ideology of the country.
Though the will to transform the cityscape and adapt it to the needs of the
new rulers is a common feature in urban history, what makes the case of Jeru-
salem peculiar is that these acts have been presented to international public
opinion as the “restoration” of the Old City of Jerusalem. With great ingenuity,
Israel has been able to present itself as “restorer” of the city’s heritage, enlight-
ened “caretaker” of the holy sites and defender of the menaced urban fabric of
the city.
The destruction of the Moroccan Quarter and the creation of the Wailing
Wall esplanade in its stead, therefore, not only exemplify the strict relationship
between architecture, planning, heritage, symbolism and nationalism, but more-
over demonstrate Israel’s overall ability to successfully re-write history according
to its needs.
The reconstructed neighbourhood, however, was also planned to stress the
cohesion of Israeli society and to promote the “national” dimension of the Jewish
people, using urban reconstruction to achieve a synthesis between religious and
nationalist traditions. The interplay of tradition and modernity, of secular social-
ist Israel and traditional Judaism, however, proved to be beyond the capabilities
of the state to manage, especially when its ideological basis was shaken following
the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The conscious use of religious symbolism, which the
secular ruling class initially introduced, escaped their control, and the reconstructed
Jewish Quarter increasingly developed along autonomous and partially unexpected
lines, reflecting the wider transformation of Jerusalem’s population and the evo-
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Abstract
The article analyzes the transformation of the Wailing Wall area after 1967. The
Wall has been considered within an architectural and planning perspective presenting
the urban transformations made to underline its ‘eternal’ centrality. The role of the
Wall in shaping Israeli national identity has been discussed through the lenses of the
recent heritage studies theories. It is argued that Israel needed physical, tangible
symbols to sustain its claims on the city and that the reconstruction of the whole
area defined as “Jewish Quarter”, and particularly the creation of the large Plaza in
front of the Wailing Wall, were meant to give the State of Israel an “incontrovertible”
proof of its historic rights on the city.
Key words: Jerusalem, heritage, Wailing Wall, nationalism, conservation.
Résumé
Cet article présente les modifications de la zone devant le Mur des Lamentations
après 1967. Dans le cadre d’une réflexion menée à l’échelle de l’ensemble de la vieille
ville de Jérusalem, le Mur a été analysé du point de vue architectural et urbain en
soulignant les transformations qu’il a subies afin de devenir l’élément clé de la « capi-
tale éternelle » du pays. Les études récentes sur le concept de patrimoine ont fourni
les bases théoriques de cette analyse du rôle du Mur dans la formation de l’identité
nationale israélienne. L’article affirme que l’État d’Israël avait besoin de symboles
physiques et tangibles qui puissent confirmer son droit de possession de la ville et
souligne comment la reconstruction d’un secteur entier de la vieille ville renommé
« Quartier Juif », ainsi que la création d’une large esplanade devant le Mur des
Lamentations, avaient pour fonction de donner une preuve “incontestable” des droits
historiques d’Israël sur la ville de Jérusalem.
Mots-clés : Jérusalem, patrimoine, Mur des Lamentations, nationalisme, restauration.
Resumen
Este artículo pone el foco en los cambios desde 1967 en el espacio delante del Muro
de las Lamentaciones. contextualizado en una reflexión incluyendo toda la ciudad
vieja de Jerusalén; el Muro es examinado desde el punto de vista arquitectural y
urbano, centrándose la análisis en las transformaciones que sufrió para convertirse
en el elemento clave de la capital “eterna” de Israel. La investigación reciente del
concepto de patrimonio es la base teórica de esta análisis del papel del Muro en la
formación de la identidad nacional israelí. El artículo afirma que el Estado de Israel
carecía de símbolos físicos tangibles para poder sostener su derecho de propiedad de
la ciudad. El articulo alega que la reconstrucción de todo el Barrio Judío de la ciudad
vieja y la creación de una plaza ancha delante del Muro de las Lamentaciones tenían
como objetivo ser pruebas irrebatibles de los derechos históricos de Israel sobre la
ciudad de Jerusalén.
Palabras clave: Jerusalén, patrimonio, Muro de las Lamentaciones, nacionalismo,
conservación.
